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NOTE
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.: The Need for a
Commercial Activity Exception to the
Act of State Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of the United States courts to adjudicate claims against
foreign sovereigns is limited by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 ("FSIA")' and the act of state doctrine.2 The FSIA gives United
States courts jurisdiction over foreign states when the action is based
upon an act "in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere."3 The act of state doctrine as traditionally defined, how-
ever, does not appear to encompass such a commercial activity excep-
tion.4 Since virtually any act of a foreign state may be defined as an act of
state,5 traditional application of the act of state doctrine renders many
claims nonjusticiable in United States courts.'
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982). See infra notes 42-45
and accompanying text.
2 The act of state doctrine is a common law rule precluding adjudication by a United States
court of the legality of public acts of a foreign government carried out within its own territory.
McCormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State
Doctrine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 478 (1984). See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying
text.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See infra note 44 for the text of the statutory exception.
4 See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
5 See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360 n.56 (R. Tucker ed. 1966) (any
act may become a public act if it is undertaken by a state).
6 See McCormick, supra note 2, at 478. The foreign sovereign immunity and act of state doc-
trines address the same considerations of comity and separation of powers, yet they operate in differ-
ent ways and serve different functions. Sovereign immunity shields the foreign sovereign and its
agents from jurisdiction, while the act of state doctrine protects the sovereign's internal laws and
proclamations from intrusive scrutiny. Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), afJ'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the
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The drafters of the FSIA considered the possibility that by permit-
ting absolute immunity to be applied in instances where the FSIA pre-
cluded such immunity,7 the act of state doctrine might be used to
frustrate the intent underlying the commercial activity exception of the
FSIA.' This possibility, however, was dismissed9 based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.'°
In Dunhill, a plurality of the Court held that the "concept of an act
of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely
commercial obligation... ." ", Since Dunhill was decided before the FSIA
was enacted, the drafters believed that the FSIA would preclude the ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine where a foreign state's commercial
acts were at issue. 2 Thus the legislative intent was that both the FSIA
and the act of state doctrine be restricted by commercial acts of foreign
states.1
3
Recently, the Fifth Circuit in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. 14 examined
Act of State: The Need for a Commercial Act Exception to the Commercial Act Exception, 17
U.S.F.L. REv. 763, 772-73 (1983) (discussing the independent but interrelated nature of the act of
state and sovereign immunity doctrines).
7 The House Report states:
The committee has been advised that in some cases, after the defense of sovereign immunity has
been denied or removed as an issue, the act of state doctrine may be improperly asserted in an
effort to block litigation....
The committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine in this legisla-
tion since decisions such as that in the Dunhill case demonstrate that our courts already have
considerable guidance enabling them to reject improper assertions of the act of state doctrine.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 20 n.1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6619 n. 1 [hereinafter House Report].
8 See infra note 44.
9 House Report, supra note 7, at 20 n.1, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6619 n.l.
10 425 U.S. 682 (1976); see Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act In Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009, 1054 (1979) (Congress de-
cided it was not necessary to address the act of state doctrine in view of Dunhill).
11 425 U.S. at 695. Because Dunhill was a plurality decision, it is disputed whether a commer-
cial activity exception to the act of state doctrine was created or whether the Court merely failed to
find that an act of state took place in Dunhill. See, eg., Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immu-
nity: A Further Inquiry, 11 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 193, 205 (1980) (question of a commercial activity
exception to the act of state doctrine remains unsettled); Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State
Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 369, 385 (1980) (Dunhill
did not create a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine); The Supreme Court-
1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 265, 266 (1976) (no resolution of the question of limiting act of state
doctrine to noncommercial acts). For a detailed discussion of Dunhill, see infra notes 113-35 and
accompanying text.
12 House Report, supra note 7, at 20 n.1, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6619 n.l:
"[lilt appears that the [act of state] doctrine would not apply to the cases covered by H.R. 11315 [the
FSIA], whose touchstone is a concept of 'commercial activity' involving significant jurisdictional
contacts with this country."
13 See supra notes 7 & 12.
14 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
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the plurality's commercial activity exception in Dunhil,15 yet declined to
decide whether to adopt the exception with respect to the act of state
doctrine.1 6 The court held that the defendant Mexican bank, by issuing
certificates of deposit ("CDs"), was engaged in a commercial activity,
thus invoking the commercial activity exception of the FSIA.'7 Such
activity provided United States courts with jurisdiction.'" The defendant
failed to repay the face amount of the CDs to the United States plaintiffs
because the Mexican government issued compulsory monetary exchange
rate restrictions. 9 Mexico's actions were categorized by the Fifth Cir-
cuit as sovereign, not commercial, in nature.20 Since adjudicating the
plaintiffs' claims would necessarily call into question the Mexican regula-
tions, the court dismissed the claims under the act of state doctrine.2'
The court's action was therefore contrary to Congress' assumption that
the act of state doctrine would not be used to undermine the commercial
activity exception of the FSIA.22
This Note analyzes the commercial activity exception to the act of
state doctrine as espoused in Dunhil2 3 and examines the Fifth Circuit's
treatment of the exception in Callejo.2" Although the Callejo court
avoided a decision on the validity of the exception, this Note argues that
the facts in Callejo indicate that such a decision was necessary.25 The
Note concludes that a rule-oriented approach to the situation should
have been utilized and that, under such an approach, the Callejo plain-
tiffs' claims should have been adjudicated. 6
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity and the FSIA
Foreign sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional principle of interna-
tional law which precludes the courts of one sovereign from asserting
jurisdiction over a foreign government or its agents.27 The first applica-
15 See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
16 764 F.2d at 1115.
17 Id. at 1110. For the text of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, see infra note 44.
18 764 F.2d at 1112.
19 Id. at 1106.
20 Id. at 1115.
21 Id. at 1116, 1125-26.
22 See supra notes 7, 9-10 & 12 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 145-54 and 159-64 and accompanying text.
27 McCormick, supra note 2, at 478.
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tion of the doctrine in the United States allowed foreign governments
absolute immunity from the jurisdictions of United States courts.2" Rea-
sons underlying the early practice of absolute immunity included the
need to protect the dignity of the foreign sovereign,29 the desire for recip-
rocal immunity for the United States in foreign courts, 30 and the inability
of domestic courts to enforce judicial decisions against a foreign nation.31
This theory of absolute immunity was abandoned in 1952 when the
State Department, in the issuance of the "Tate Letter,"32 announced the
adoption of a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.33 This restrictive
theory accords immunity to a sovereign only when it is acting in a public
capacity.34 According to the Tate Letter, immunity would no longer be
asserted by the State Department on bdhalf of foreign sovereigns in suits
arising from private or commercial activity.35 The three principal rea-
sons set forth in the Tate Letter for the official shift to the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity were: (1) increased international accept-
ance of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and an official desire
for reciprocity; (2) the elimination of the advantage which communist
countries derived from absolute sovereign immunity because all of their
commercial activity was immune; and (3) growing governmental involve-
28 See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The Schooner
Exchange action was brought by United States plaintiffs who alleged that the ship Exchange was
forcibly taken from them on the high seas by persons acting under Napoleon's orders. Id. at 117.
Chief Justice Marshall refused to exercise jurisdiction over the Exchange (which was then located in
Philadelphia Harbor) on the ground that the vessel, as a ship of a peaceful foreign sovereign, "must
be considered as having come into the American territory, under an implied promise, that while
necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt from the
jurisdiction of the country." Id. at 147.
29 Id. at 137.
30 Id. at 146.
31 Id. For a detailed examination of the reasons why a foreign state should be immune from
United States legal proceedings, see Comment, Sovereign Immunity and the Foreign-State Enterprise
in Alaska, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 343, 347-48 (1975).
32 Letter from Jack B. Tate, State Department Acting Legal Advisor, to Philip B. Perlman,
Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
33 Id. For a critical analysis of the Tate Letter, see Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting
Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 95 (1953) ("There seems no doubt that the adoption by
the United States of its new policy restricting sovereign immunity is fully in accord with the obliga-
tions of international law.").
34 Id. Latin terms are sometimes used: public acts are jure imperil and private acts are jure
gestionis. The Tate Letter, however, did not establish any guidelines for distinguishing between pub-
lic and private acts. For a discussion of cases attempting to delineate such guidelines following the
Tate Letter, see Cooper, supra note 11, at 210-14.
35 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 984-85. The rationale for the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
first appeared in Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824),
where Chief Justice Marshall stated that "when a government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign char-
acter, and takes [the character] of a private citizen."
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ment in commercial matters worldwide. 36  The State Department also
expressed a hope that the courts would follow suit.3 7
The leading case interpreting and upholding restrictive immunity is
Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General.8 In Victory Transport, the
Second Circuit held that when a foreign government chartered a ship to
transport wheat, the foreign government was subject to the jurisdiction of
United States courts because the government was engaged in a private,
commercial transaction.3 9  The court stated that immune public acts
included:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activities;
(5) public loans.'
Despite these relatively clear rules espoused by the Victory Transport
court, continued intervention by the State Department hindered the sys-
tematic development of the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine.41
The resulting disorder presented a need for codification of the doctrine.
Passed in 1976, the FSIA codified the restrictive theory of foreign
36 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 984:85.
37 "[A] shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but.., the courts are less likely
to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so." Id. at 985. See
infra note 38.
38 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See also Southeastern Leasing
Corp. v. Stem Dragger Belogorsk, 493 F.2d 1223 (1st Cir. 1974); AMKOR Corp. v. Bank of Korea,
298 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The cited cases support the position that a State Department
suggestion will preclude a judicial determination of immunity. See also Carl, supra note 10, at 1012
n.15 (State Department's definition of the scope of sovereign immunity is frequently controlling
because federal courts defer to the Department's assertion of sovereign immunity).
39 336 F.2d at 360-62.
40 Id. at 360. The court stated that this list of categories could be enlarged or contracted by the
State Department. Id.
41 Subsequent to the issuance of the Tate Letter, the State Department continued to advise the
courts with respect to sovereign immunity questions. This intervention by the State Department was
not, however, entirely consistent with the policies espoused in the Tate Letter. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania stated:
Irrespective of its clear meaning, it appears that the State Department has silently abandoned
the "revised and restricted policy" set forth in the Tate letter and has substituted a case by case
foreign Sovereign Immunity policy, i.e., the State Department will recognize and suggest, or fail
to recognize or grant or suggest Sovereign Immunity in each case presented to it, depending
(a) upon the foreign and diplomatic relations which our Country has at that particular time
with the other Country, and (2) [sic] the best interests of our Country at that particular time.
Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 159, 215 A.2d 864, 876
(1966) (emphasis in original). See also Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity:
A Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1440, 1455 (1983) (sovereign immunity doctrine could not
develop along the lines of the Victory Transport decision due to politically motivated State Depart-
ment intervention); Comment, supra note 31, at 362 n.70 ("The strict adherence of the State Depart-
ment to the doctrines of the Tate Letter is somewhat in doubt.").
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sovereign immunity42 and provided the courts with the power to deal
with claims of sovereign immunity.43 The FSIA embodies the commer-
cial activity exception which allows United States courts to exercise juris-
diction over foreign governments engaging in private, commercial acts.'
Congress recognized that the sovereign loses its attributes of sovereignty
when it engages in commercial acts; therefore, the sovereign should be
treated like a private citizen with regard to those acts.4 5
B. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine, like the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
comes "from the thoroughly sound principle that on occasion individual
litigants may have to forego decision on the merits of their claims be-
cause the involvement of the courts in such a decision might frustrate the
conduct of the Nation's foreign policy."46 In its modem form, the act of
state doctrine is a common law rule which precludes adjudication by a
United States court of the legality of public acts of a foreign government
carried out within its own territory.4 7 In 1897, the Supreme Court set
forth the classic expression of the act of state doctrine in Underhill v.
Hernandez:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Re-
dress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
4 8
42 The legislative history indicates that this was the primary purpose of the FSIA. House Re-
port, supra note 7, at 7-8, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6605-06. See infra note 44.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982) provides in part:
[The determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity...
would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants.... Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned .... Claims of foreign states to
immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States....
44 The relevant parts of the commercial activity exception in the FSIA are:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or
of the States in any case- ....
(2) in which the action is based.., upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The FSIA defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
46 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 (1972) (plurality opinion
adopting an exception to the act of state doctrine based on a State Department letter which advised
that United States foreign policy would not be disrupted if the Court adjudicated claims based upon
commercial activities). See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
47 McCormick, supra note 2, at 478.
48 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). An earlier example of a United States court applying the doctrine is
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Although the history of the act of state doctrine is long and com-
plex,49 the doctrine's modem concepts spring mainly from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.5 ° In Sabbatino,
the Court renounced its proposition in Underhill that the act of state
doctrine is rooted in principles of sovereign immunity. 1 Instead, the
Court held that, although it is not constitutionally required, the doctrine
has constitutional underpinnings because it is rooted in the "basic rela-
tionships [among] branches of government in a system of separation of
powers." 2 The Supreme Court stated:
[R]ather than laying down... [an] all-encompassing rule in this case, we
decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a tak-
ing of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government
... in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking
violates customary international law.
5 3
More recently, however, the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion in
Dunhill held that the act of state doctrine would not apply to a commer-
cial act. 4 Writing for the plurality, Justice White took the view that
international comity is not involved where a sovereign engages in com-
mercial acts.55 The exception was viewed by the plurality as having simi-
lar policy justifications as the commercial activity exception to the
sovereign immunity doctrine. 56 Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion re-
jected the theory that commercial acts are always private acts and stated
that where international comity is involved, the "validity of an act of a
foreign sovereign is . . . a 'political question' not cognizable in our
Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293 (1808) where a United States ship violated French mu-
nicipal law and was ultimately condemned by a French court. Id. at 293. The United States
Supreme Court stated, with respect to the United States plaintiffs' claim, that "no foreign court is at
liberty to question the correctness of what is done [by a foreign state]." Id. at 294.
49 For a further discussion of the origins of the act of state doctrine, see, generally, Note, Reha-
bilitation and Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 599, 600-10
(1980) (arguing for a more limited scope of the act of state doctrine) [hereinafter Note, Rehabilita-
tion and Exoneration].
50 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
51 Id. at 421.
52 Id. at 423.
53 Id. at 428. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
54 425 U.S. at 695. The Department of Justice "strongly urged the Supreme Court to embrace
the commercial [activity] exception" to the act of state doctrine. Starr, Department of Justice Views,
in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 13, 14 (J. Lacey ed. 1983). The Department
currently views the plurality's decision in Dunhill to recognize such an exception as a "partial suc-
cess." Id. For a detailed presentation of Dunhill, see infra notes 113-35 and accompanying text.
55 425 U.S. at 695-706 (1976) (plurality opinion).
56 Id. at 705-06. These justifications were espoused in the Tate Letter. See supra notes 32-37
and accompanying text.
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court.
' 57
Notwithstanding the fact that the commercial activity exception was
accepted by only a plurality of the Court,58 there is evidence that the
exception is evolving into a rule of law. Two authors, Victor S. Fried-
man and Leslie A. Blau, have suggested that in a more suitable factual
situation than Dunhill,5 9 the commercial activity exception will be
adopted by the Supreme Court.6" Friedman and Blau note that a govern-
ment should not be permitted to assert its sovereign status as a "blanket
protection against liability" incurred while engaged in commercial deal-
ings.6 1 They reason that a governmental body in the commercial arena
should not be granted the vast advantage of enjoying, without limita-
tions, the privileges of sovereignty while private parties in the same arena
are not allowed any such immunity.62 In addition to this concern regard-
ing fair dealings by sovereigns in the commercial arena, these authors
posit that the commercial dealings of sovereigns should be subject to ju-
dicial scrutiny in order to determine whether the transactions are merely
subterfuges intended to avoid commercial obligations.63 They point to
cases' where courts sanctioned judicial inquiry to determine whether the
acts of a foreign government were procured by private parties. Friedman
and Blau analogize that "[i]f the courts are willing to scrutinize the good
57 Id. at 727.
58 See supra note 11.
59 In Dunhill, the Cuban government appointed "interventors" to take possession of five Cuban
cigar manufacturers. 425 U.S. at 685. American importers then paid the interventors for amounts
due to the manufacturers. The importers later asserted a claim against the interventors to return the
money because the original owners of the cigar companies were suing the importers for payment.
The interventors asserted the act of state defense. Id. at 686-87. See infra notes 113-35 and accom-
panying text for a further discussion of Dunhill.
60 Friedman & Blau, Formulating a Commercial Exception to the Act of State Doctrine: Alfred
Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 666, 681 (1976). Friedman and
Blau were counsel of record to Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. Their article discusses the Dunhill
litigation in detail and concludes that a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine is
needed. For a discussion of their reasoning, see infra text accompanying notes 61-65. See also Note
Rehabilitation and Exoneration, supra note 49, at 637 (The commercial activity exception "appears
to stand on the verge of becoming a well-entrenched boundary for the act of state doctrine. It is
apparently only a matter of time until the [exception] is universally declared a rule of law in Ameri-
can courts."). But see Note, International Association of Machinists v. OPEC: The Ninth Circuit
Breathes New Life into the Act-of-State Doctrine in Commercial Settings, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 427 (1982) (arguing that a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine is not
evolving into law, and that such an exception would not eliminate the risk of adverse judicial inter-
ference in politically sensitive foreign relations).
61 Friedman & Blau, supra note 60, at 681.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 684.
64 United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Tex-
aco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970), cited in Friedman & Blau, supra note 60, at
684-85.
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.
7:413(1985)
faith of the acts of foreign governments which are claimed to justify the
behavior of nongovernmental entities, they should similarly be willing to
examine the acts of a sovereign which affect its nongovernmental com-
mercial transactions. ' 5
Courts also have evidenced a trend toward accepting the commer-
cial activity exception to the act of state doctrine. The Second Circuit, at
least in dicta, favors adoption of the exception as a rule of law. Judge
Mulligan in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.66 observed that "Dunhill declined to
extend the act of state doctrine to situations where the sovereign has de-
scended to the level of an entrepreneur."'67 The court applied the act of
state doctrine, however, to bar plaintiffs' recovery in Hunt where a Lib-
yan oil producer brought an action against other oil producers to recover
for alleged violation of antitrust laws.68 The complaint alleged that de-
fendant oil producers prevented plaintiffs from reaching a settlement
with Libya upon Libya's nationalization of plaintiffs' operations.69 The
United States characterized the expropriation as a "political reprisal
against the United States .... 7 0  The Hunt court held that such acts
were "an example of non-commercial sovereign activity within the ambit
of the [act of state] doctrine."
71
In another case, D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos,72 the court found
it necessary to note that D'Angelo did not fall within the scope of the
commercial activity exception despite the fact that Dunhill was a plural-
ity decision.73 The D'Angelo court held that, even though the Mexican
government entered into the commercial arena of oil production by ex-
propriating a United States corporation, the expropriation itself was not
a commercial activity and was therefore outside of the Dunhill
exception.74
65 Friedman & Blau, supra note 60, at 685.
66 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
67 Id. at 73; accord Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680,
689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300, 316 n.38 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting the existence of several purported "exceptions" to the act
of state doctrine), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). But see Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d
222, 225 (2d Cir. 1985) (not yet considering the possible existence in the Second Circuit of a com-
mercial act exception to the act of state doctrine under Dunhill).
68 550 F.2d at 73.
69 Id. at 71-72.
70 Id. at 73.
71 Id.
72 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976), affid mem., 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1035 (1978).
73 Id. at 1286; accord Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 458 (D. Del.
1978).
74 422 F. Supp. at 1286.
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Some jurisdictions, however, do not recognize a commercial activity
exception to the act of state doctrine. The Ninth Circuit in International
Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers, (IAM) v. Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),75 for example, held that the
act of state defense was applicable despite the commercial acts of a de-
fendant foreign government.76 In this case, IAM brought suit against
OPEC and its member nations alleging that OPEC's price setting vio-
lated United States antitrust laws. 7 The court dismissed the case on act
of state grounds, stating that the courts should not interfere with "a deli-
cate area of foreign policy which the executive and legislative branches
have chosen to approach with restraint."78 The Ninth Circuit thus disre-
garded any indications that the Supreme Court, as well as the general
trend of the law, has become sympathetic to a commercial activity excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine.7 9
The Fifth Circuit in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. discussed Dunhill's
commercial activity exception yet applied the act of state doctrine to bar
adjudication.80 The defendant in Callejo repaid a debt contract at below
current exchange rates in accordance with a regulation promulgated by
the Mexican government. The court found that the defendant's activity
was sovereign, not commercial, in nature.81 The activity was, therefore,
held to be outside of the scope of the exception.82 Furthermore, the
court declined to rule on the validity of the commercial activity excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine in the Fifth Circuit.83
III. THE CALLEJO LITIGATION
A. Background
William and Adelfa Callejo, the plaintiffs in Callejo v. Bancomer,
S.A., were United States citizens residing in Texas. 84 The Callejos
purchased CDs issued by Bancomer, a privately-owned Mexican bank
starting in 1979 or 1980.85 Bancomer operated a branch office in Los
Angeles and an agency in New York City. In Texas, Bancomer main-
75 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
76 Id. at 1360. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
77 Id. at 1355.
78 Id. at 1361.
79 See generally McCormick, supra note 2, at 514-19.
80 764 F.2d at 1125.
81 Id. at 1115.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1105.
85 Id.
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tained accounts with two local banks.86
The four CDs at issue in Callejo were purchased on May 31 and
June 3, 1982.87 All four CDs were denominated in United States dollars
and called for repayment, including interest, in United States dollars.88
Their total value was approximately $300,000 and they specified on their
face Mexico City as the place of payment.89
In the summer of 1982, Mexico experienced a severe economic re-
cession by a decline in world oil prices. 90 In the late 1970s, Mexico initi-
ated "an ambitious domestic spending program financed by substantial
overseas borrowing." 91 Mexico was then realizing high foreign currency
revenues from the sale of oil.92 By August 1982, however, world oil
prices had fallen significantly.93  The drop in oil prices seriously re-
stricted the primary source of foreign exchange Mexico required to repay
its debt and placed severe pressure on the Mexican peso in foreign ex-
change markets.94
Faced with this crisis, the Mexican government issued a decree on
August 13, 1982 mandating a ban on the use of foreign currency as legal
tender and requiring all domestic obligations to be paid with pesos at the
prevailing market exchange rate.95 Two more decrees were issued on
September 1, 1982, one nationalizing all of Mexico's private banks, in-
cluding Bancomer, the other requiring repayment of United States dol-
lar-denominated CDs and other debt obligations in pesos at a specified
rate of exchange.
96
The Callejos' complaint alleged breach of contract because
Bancomer failed to repay the face amount of the CDs and also alleged
securities act violations against Bancomer.97 Bancomer's motion to dis-
86 Id.









96 Id. The government set the exchange rate at 70 pesos to the dollar. 764 F.2d at 1106 n.2.
The market exchange rate on September 1, 1982 was 121 pesos to the dollar. Wall St. J., Sept. 2,
1982, at 30, col. 6. By November, 1982, the market rate rose to more than 130 pesos to the dollar.
764 F.2d at 1106 n.2.
97 764 F.2d at 1106. The plaintiffs alleged that Bancomer's failure to register the CDs violated
§ 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1)(1982), and § 33A.1 of the Texas Securities
Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33A.1 (Vernon 1977). The Fifth Circuit held that since
adjudicating the securities claims would not involve reviewing the validity of Mexico's exchange
control regulations, the claims were not barred by the act of state doctrine. 764 F.2d at 1125 n.33.
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miss was granted by the district court which relied on sovereign immu-
nity in granting the motion.98 The district court held that Bancomer was
an instrumentality of the Mexican government and that the Callejo's
claim was based on the issuance of exchange control regulations by Mex-
ico, an activity found to be sovereign, not commercial.9 9 The lower court
dismissed the claims, holding that Bancomer was immune from suit
under the FSIA.1 " The district court did not reach the act of state ques-
tion because the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.1 0 1 The Cal-
lejos then appealed the lower court's decision.
B. The Fifth Circuit's Decision
The Fifth Circuit reached the same result as the district court, but
with different reasoning.10 2 The appellate court found the plaintiffs'
claim to be based on Bancomer's breach of its contractual obligations,
not Mexico's promulgation of exchange control regulations as the district
court found. 103 The contractual obligations were classified by the appel-
late court as commercial in nature because "they were of a kind that a
private individual would customarily enter into for profit."" °  The court
also held that Bancomer did not "acquire any derivative immunity [for
purposes of the FSIA] by virtue of the fact that, in breaching the terms of
the certificates of deposit, it was merely complying with the sovereign
decrees of the Mexican government.10 5 Since Bancomer's activities were
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the claims. It found that the CDs issued by Bancomer "were not
'securities' within the meaning of the federal and Texas securities laws." Id. Moreover, purchasers
of the CDs did not require the protections afforded by federal securities laws because they were
protected by Mexican banking law. The court applied this conclusion to the Texas securities law
claim because the meaning of "securities" as construed by federal courts is considered by Texas
courts to be "a 'reliable guide' to the definition of 'securities' under the Texas Act." Id. (citing First
Municipal Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart, 648 S.W.2d 410, 414
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983)).
98 764 F.2d at 1104.
99 Id. at 1104, 1108. The appellate court subsequently determined that the Callejos' claim was
based on Bancomer's breach of the CD contracts. Id. at 1108-09. See infra notes 103-07 and accom-
panying text.
100 Id. at 1104-05.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1105.
103 Id. at 1109; accord Braka, 589 F. Supp. at 1469 ("[A]nalysis must focus on the named defend-
ant's acts which are the basis of the action and not on the separate acts of other sovereign instrumen-
talities or agencies.").
104 Id.
105 Id. The court cited Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980)
as precedent. In Arango, the plaintiffs brought breach of contract, negligence, battery, and false
imprisonment charges against the Dominican national airline after they had been denied entry into
the Dominican Republic for a vacation. The Fifth Circuit held that the airline was not entitled to
sovereign immunity on the breach of contract and tort claims even though it was only complying
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neither themselves sovereign nor entitled to derivative immunity by vir-
tue of compliance with Mexican law, the Fifth Circuit held that the com-
mercial activity exception to the FSIA 1°6 applied, "and that jurisdiction
is consequently not barred by sovereign immunity.""1 7
The Fifth Circuit refused, however, to adjudicate the plaintiffs'
claims, holding that the act of state doctrine operated as a bar.108 In its
analysis of the act of state doctrine, the court found Mexico's exchange
rate promulgations to be a sovereign, not a commercial act. 10 9 The court
stated that the "power to issue exchange control regulations is
paradigmatically sovereign in nature; it is not of a type that a private
person can exercise." 110 Since adjudicating the Callejos' claims would
necessarily call into question the Mexican government's regulations, the
court applied the act of state doctrine to affirm dismissal of the suit.111
Furthermore, since the Fifth Circuit held Mexico's regulations to be sov-
ereign in nature, the court did not need to decide whether to adopt the
commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine.'
12
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Dunhill Litigation
The Callejos argued that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable to
their case because Mexico's promulgation specifying an official exchange
rate for repayment of domestic debts was a commercial act and therefore
should fall into the commercial activity exception to the act of state doc-
trine"' as announced in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
with the government's sovereign decision to deny entry to the plaintiffs. Id. at 1379-80. The airline
was entitled to sovereign immunity on the battery and false imprisonment claims, however, because
it acted as a sovereign itself by participating directly in those acts. Id. at 1379. In Callejo, the court
noted that Bancomer was merely complying with the government's order and acting as any private
party would in complying with the law, thus Bancomer was not entitled to sovereign immunity for
breaching its contractual obligations. 764 F.2d at 1110.
106 See supra note 44.
107 764 F.2d at 1112.
108 Id. at 1125-26.
109 Id. at 1115.
110 Id. at 1116. The Callejo court also relied on the reasoning found in Braka, which dealt with a
substantially similar factual situation:
Mexico's act in this instance cannot be construed as a simple repudiation of a government
entity's commercial debt. While the ultimate result may seem similar-i.e. Mexico has enriched
itself at plaintiff's expense-the mechanisms used by Mexico are conventional devices of civi-
lized nations faced with severe monetary crises, rather than the crude and total confiscation by
force of a private person's assets.
589 F. Supp. at 1472.
111 Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1125-26.
112 Id. at 1115 & n.17.
113 Two other arguments were raised by the Callejos to persuade the court that the act of state
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Cuba.14 The Dunhill case arose out of the confiscation by the Cuban
government of the business and assets of five Cuban cigar manufactur-
ers.115 The Cuban government appointed "interventors" to replace the
old ownership and to take possession and operate the businesses.' 1 6 Af-
ter intervention, Dunhill, a United States importer of Cuban cigars, and
two other United States importers, made payment to the interventors for
cigars purchased prior to intervention under the assumption that the in-
terventors were entitled to collect the accounts receivable of the confis-
cated businesses." 7 The former owners of the confiscated businesses
then sued the importers, claiming the importers made erroneous pay-
ments to the interventors and that payment was still due them from the
importers." 8 The importers asserted a claim against the interventors and
the Cuban government for recovery of their mistaken payments." 9 The
interventors defended upon the ground that their refusal to repay the
importers was an act of state not subject to adjudication in United States
courts. 120
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, 2' rejected the in-
terventors' argument and ruled that the interventors had to return the
erroneous payments they received from the importers. 122 Justice White,
writing for the majority, found no evidence that the interventors had
been vested with sovereign authority to repudiate the debts incurred in
their businesses.
123
Only three other justices 24 joined in Part III of Justice White's
doctrine was inapplicable to their case. First, the Callejos asserted that the "treaty exception" to the
act of state doctrine was applicable since the exchange control regulations violated Mexico's obliga-
tions under the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, as amended Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. Second, the
Callejos alleged that the situs of the CDs was Texas rather than Mexico, and therefore the CDs were
not governed by the Mexican decrees. The Fifth Circuit rejected both of these arguments. 764 F.2d
at 1116-25.
114 425 U.S. 682, 695-706 (1976) (plurality opinion).
115 A history of the Dunhill litigation is found in Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F.
Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) and Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973).
116 425 U.S. at 685.
117 Id. at 686.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 687.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 684.
122 Id. at 690-95.
123 "No statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Government itself was offered in evi-
dence indicating that Cuba had repudiated its obligations in general or any class thereof or that it
had as a sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due three foreign importers." Id. at
695.
124 These were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. See infra notes 133-35
and accompanying text for the dissent's views.
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opinion which considered an exception to the act of state doctrine for
foreign sovereigns engaged in commercial acts.1 25 A letter from the State
Department urged that the act of state doctrine should not be applied to
foreign acts which are "commercial, and not public, in nature.1 26 Jus-
tice White endorsed this exception and sought to apply it to Cuba's repu-
diation of the obligation to repay in Dunhill.'27
Justice White concluded that a commercial activity exception to the
act of state doctrine would not enhance the ills which the doctrine seeks
to alleviate, primarily embarrassment to the Executive Branch in the
conduct of foreign relations. 128 On the contrary, he feared "that embar-
rassment and conflict would more likely ensue if we were to require that
the repudiation of a foreign government's debts arising from its operation
of a purely commercial business be recognized as an act of state and
immunized from question in our courts."'
29
In further support of his position, Justice White noted that the lower
courts in the United States have adopted the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity, 3 ' premised on the notion that sovereigns entering the
world marketplace should have their conduct judged as private liti-
gants.131 Where a nation, such as Cuba in Dunhill, is estopped under the
restrictive theory from asserting sovereign immunity as a defense, Justice
White felt it inequitable for the nation to turn to the act of state doctrine
for the same defense:
Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with this restrictive
approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act of state; for if it were,
foreign governments, by merely repudiating the debt before or after its adju-
dication, would enjoy an immunity which our Government would not ex-
tend them under prevailing sovereign immunity principles in this country.
This would undermine the policy supporting the restrictive view of immu-
nity, which is to assure those engaging in commercial transactions with for-
eign sovereignties that their rights will be determined in the courts
whenever possible.
1 32
The dissent in Dunhill avoided this question of whether the act of state
doctrine was being applied to undermine the restrictive theory of sover-
eign immunity.1
33
125 425 U.S. at 695-706.
126 Id. at 707.
127 Id. at 705.
128 Id. at 698.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text. The FSIA codified the restrictive theory.
132 425 U.S. at 698-99.
133 Id. at 715-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Dunhill did not rule on the
merits of the commercial activity exception since he found the exception
inapplicable to the Dunhill facts. The dissent viewed the taking of the
importers' funds as indistinguishable "for all practical purposes" from
Cuba's original intervention of the firms. 134 Therefore, since the disputed
obligation arose from the intervention, it was not "purely commercial,"
and the plurality's commercial activity exception to the act of state doc-
trine would be inapposite.135
B. The Sabbatino Balancing Test
It is important to note that the Dunhill exception is a general excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine. This is part of a movement by the
Supreme Court away from a factor-balancing perspective like the Court
set forth in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 36 and towards a more
rule-oriented approach. In Sabbatino, the Court refused to treat the act
of state doctrine as an "inflexible and all-encompassing rule" to use in
considering suits against foreign sovereigns. 137  The Sabbatino Court
found that the basis of the act of state doctrine was in "the basic relation-
ships between branches of government in a system of separation of pow-
ers." 138 The Court held that the doctrine was required to reflect "the
proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political
branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.
139
Three factors to be weighed in determining this distribution of functions
were listed by the Court. First, if there is a high degree of established
international law in the area, then a judicial decision applying this law is
appropriate.1 4" Second, the issue's impact on United States foreign rela-
tions is to be considered. 141 Finally, if the defendant state is no longer in
existence, then the courts may adjudicate more freely a dispute involving
the acts of the nonexistent state. 1
42
134 Id. at 729.
135 Id. at 729 & n.16.
136 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
137 Id. at 428.
138 Id. at 423.
139 Id. at 427-28. The Court feared that judicial decisions regarding the validity of expropriations
could lead, through inconsistent actions by the Court and the President, to "embarrassment to the
Executive Branch." Id. at 433. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court at this time declined to pass on the
validity of executive suggestions which would require the judiciary to act in accordance with execu-
tive directives regarding application of the act of state doctrine. Id. at 436. The Court has since
moved away from the Sabbatino ideology. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco-Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759 (1972). See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
140 376 U.S. at 428.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit recently used this balancing test in AM v. OPEC
where the OPEC nations were alleged to have violated United States an-
titrust laws. 143 The court concluded that issues concerning the availabil-
ity of oil significantly affect international relations and that to grant
injunctive relief would insult the OPEC nations as well as interfere with
efforts of the political branches seeking favorable relief.'" Thus, the
Ninth Circuit refused to recognize a shift in the law away from the Sab-
batino balancing test.
C. The Rule-Oriented Approach
The shift by the Supreme Court after Sabbatino toward a more rule-
oriented approach to act of state questions was first discernible in First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba.'45 This case involved a
loan by First National City Bank ("Citibank") to the predecessor of
Banco Nacional de Cuba that was secured by a pledge of United States
government bonds.' 46 After the Castro government came to power, Ci-
tibank's branches in Cuba were seized. 47 Citibank responded by selling
the collateral securing the loan and then applying the proceeds to repay
the principal and unpaid interest. 4 ' Almost two million dollars in excess
of the principal and accrued interest was realized by Citibank.'49 Banco
Nacional de Cuba sued Citibank for the excess. Citibank then set-off and
filed a counterclaim asserting its right to recover out of the excess its
damages incurred from the expropriation. 50 A plurality of the Court
held that Citibank's counterclaim was not barred by the act of state
doctrine.' 5 '
The Department of State advised the Citibank Court "that the act of
state doctrine should not be applied to bar consideration of a defendant's
counterclaim or set-off against the Government of Cuba in this or like
cases."' 152 In the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that be-
143 649 F.2d at 1361; see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
144 Id.
145 406 U.S. 759 (1972). The Dunhill case and its commercial activity exception to the act of
state doctrine is also a part of the trend away from Sabbatino. See supra notes 113-32 and accompa-
nying text.
146 Id. at 760.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 761.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 768.
152 Id. at 764. The Department of State relied on the decision in Bernstein v. N.V. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), which recognized
the principle that where the Executive Branch publicly advises the Court not to apply the act of state
doctrine, the Court should proceed to examine the pending issues on their merits. Id. at 376. Execu-
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cause the act of state doctrine is based chiefly on the policy that the Judi-
cial Branch should not interfere with the Executive's conduct of foreign
affairs, the doctrine need not be applied in cases where the Executive
Branch maintains that the Court's decision will not interfere with United
States foreign policy. 15 3 Since the Citibank plurality considered execu-
tive suggestions not to apply the act of state doctrine as dispositive, and
not as merely one factor to balance, the Court spoke of a general excep-
tion to the act of state doctrine in such cases.154
D. Callejo and the Commercial Activity Exception
In Callejo, the Mexican government effectively repudiated almost
half of its debts owed to CD holders in the United States by setting an
exchange rate for pesos well below the prevailing market rate.155 This
repudiation of Mexico's156 commercial obligations is, in form, suggestive
of a sovereign act. Since Mexico assumed a dual role as both a sovereign
and a commercial entity, it would be a fiction to characterize the repudia-
tion as a purely commercial act. It follows that it is similarly incorrect to
characterize Mexico's actions as purely sovereign. The latter, however,
is precisely what the Fifth Circuit held in Callejo.157 The Fifth Circuit
therefore never reached the issue of whether to adopt a commercial activ-
ity exception to the act of state doctrine' 58 as it should have done.
This Note argues that a commercial activity exception should exist
which allows United States courts to adjudicate disputes arising out of a
nation's commercial dealings. A sovereign engaging in an international
commercial transaction should be held to abide by the rules of interna-
tional law governing the conduct of nations. Justice White in Dunhill
emphasized that "discernable rules of international law have emerged
with regard to the commercial dealings of private parties in the interna-
tional market. The restrictive approach to sovereign immunity suggests
that these established rules should be applied to the commercial transac-
tive suggestions not to apply the act of state doctrine are currently referred to as the Bernstein
exception to the act of state doctrine. The Citibank plurality expressly adopted the Bernstein excep-
tion. 406 U.S. at 768.
153 Id. at 765-68. "[W]here the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary responsibility for
the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that the application of the act of state
doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, the doctrine should not be
applied by the courts." Id. at 768.
154 Id.
155 See supra note 96.
156 Bancomer was an "agency or instrumentality" or the Mexican government due to Mexico's
nationalization of all private banks. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1106.
157 Id. at 1115.
158 Id.
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tions of sovereign states."' 59 One well-established international rule, for
example, is that appropriate compensation must be paid to the former
owners of expropriated property.1" To enforce these rules, a judicial
forum is needed.16
Furthermore, there is a need to purge the inequities discussed by
Justice White when a sovereign attempts to bypass the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity by relying on a general act of state defense.' 62 In
Callejo, the Mexican government did exactly what Justice White was try-
ing to prevent. 163 The sale of CDs was held to be commercial, yet since
the Mexican government failed to repay the obligations, the act of state
doctrine was held to preclude judicial review.' 64 A commercial activity
exception to the act of state doctrine is needed to prevent this inconsis-
tent result in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The act of state doctrine should not be available to a sovereign or its
instrumentalities engaged in commercial activities. To allow a sovereign
absolute immunity in such instances places the sovereign in a vastly supe-
rior and unfair position with regard to private commercial parties. The
act of state doctrine should therefore encompass the restrictive theory of
159 425 U.S. at 704-05 (footnote omitted).
160 See 1 R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP
SuM AGREEMENTS 208 (1975) ("When a State deprives foreigners of their property... payment of
.prompt, adequate and effective' compensation [is required]."). See also, Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1975) ("Each State has the right.., to nationalize [or] expropriate.., ownership of foreign
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such meas-
ures .... ). For an effort to give juridical content to the adjectives "prompt, adequate and effective,"
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 187-90
(1965).
161 Courts in England and Germany have exercised domestic jurisdiction over sovereigns engag-
ing in private, commercial activities. Justices in England and Germany reason that the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity confers jurisdiction on their courts to adjudicate claims of this type
brought by citizens of their countries. For a discussion of these cases, see T. ELIAS, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 167-79 (1983). It is unclear
whether each nation's domestic tribunals or an international forum would be better suited to hear
such cases. If each country consistently applied general rules of international law, there would be
little advantage to using an international forum. The use of an international court, however, would
more likely guarantee a consistent application of international principles. For a presentation of the
modern operation of the International Court of Justice, see generally, T. ELIAS, supra, at 13-99;
Quadeer, The International Court of Justice: A Proposal to Amend its Statute, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 35
(1982) (tracing the evolution of the International Court of Justice and critically examining certain
provisions of its statute).
162 See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
163 764 F.2d at 1125-26.
164 Id.
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sovereign immunity. Sovereignty is not at stake when a nation enters the
trading community in a commercial capacity because the sovereign has
assumed the role of a private entrepreneur. Once a sovereign assumes
this role, it becomes a commercial entity, and the fact that this entity also
happens to be sovereign then becomes immaterial with respect to the en-
tity's commercial dealings. Therefore, in these circumstances, a sover-
eign should not expect to be treated any differently than the parties with
which it is dealing. The restrictive theory therefore meets the expecta-
tions of the parties.
Difficult issues arise when a nation, like Mexico in Callejo, repudi-
ates a commercial obligation while acting in a dual role as both a com-
mercial entity and a sovereign. A commercial activity exception to the
act of state doctrine is needed to prevent nations from avoiding judicial
scrutiny of public acts which result in avoidance of their commercial ob-
ligations. If Mexico's emergency exchange control regulations are valid
under international law and were not issued merely to reduce its com-
mercial debt, then the regulations should pass judicial scrutiny and Mex-
ico would be excused from the obligations.165 Such scrutiny is needed to
hold sovereigns to their obligations and to protect commercial stability
and foreign relations in the world marketplace.
Bryan J. Blankfield
165 An example of a valid transaction would be the cancellation of debt in the event of bank-
ruptcy. When dealing in a commercial capacity, however, a sovereign should not be the sole and
final judge of such matters, just as the private parties on the opposite end of the commercial relation-
ship are not afforded the same latitude.
